============================================================ TITLE: Validating Operational Assurance as a Safety Mechanism TYPE: article VERSION: 1 VERSION_ID: b8678a99-7436-45fb-846e-221eee7b12ad GENERATED_AT: 2026-02-20T15:59:04.290Z SUMMARY: Once the limits of static safety are acknowledged. If operational assurance influences system behavior, how can the monitor itself be trusted? Learn more! AUTHOR: Michael Entner DATE PUBLISHED: February 20, 2026 DATE MODIFIED: February 20, 2026 READING TIME: 8 min WORD COUNT: 1464 SOURCE URL: https://lhpoas.com/lhp-oa-systems-blog/validating-operational-assurance-as-a-safety-mechanism ============================================================ KEY TAKEAWAYS: * Blog Series: The Death of Static Safety ## Blog Series: The Death of Static Safety This is the second part of a six-part guest blog series titled "The Death of Static Safety". Today, we dive into the following topic of validating operational assurance as a safety mechanism and who exactly is watching the "watcher". To read part one of this series, we invite you to do so.  Let's dive in! ### Validating Operational Assurance as a Safety Mechanism Once the limits of static safety are acknowledged, the next objection follows naturally: if operational assurance influences system behavior, how can the monitor itself be trusted? This is the correct question. Any mechanism that can constrain, override, or transition an autonomous system becomes part of the safety chain. Treating such a mechanism as advisory analytics or post-hoc reporting is not just inaccurate, it is unsafe. Operational assurance either belongs in the safety architecture, or it does not belong at all. ### When Assurance Stops Observing and Starts Supervising There is a persistent misconception that an Operational Assurance System is simply a scoring engine that flags risk. That framing avoids the hard work of safety analysis, but it also avoids reality. The moment an assurance mechanism influences behavior, whether by constraining autonomy, triggering a fallback, or enforcing an operational boundary, it is no longer observational. It is supervisory control. At that point, the question is not whether the system is useful. The question is whether it meets the same standards applied to every other safety-related function in the vehicle. If it cannot, it does not belong in the loop. ------------------------------------------------------------ ABOUT THIS CONTENT ------------------------------------------------------------ Source: https://lhpoas.com/lhp-oa-systems-blog/validating-operational-assurance-as-a-safety-mechanism Author: Michael Entner Published: February 20, 2026 This content is provided for informational purposes. Please visit the original source for the most up-to-date information.